INTRODUCTION
The separation of powers disputes in recent decades involve frequent disagreements over the divergent constitutional interests of the two elected branches of government, the President-led Executive, and the Legislative. 1 other smaller disputes over the constitutionality of a series of statutes-because of Executive unwillingness to defend those statutes. 6 A parallel office had evolved in the House. Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill (DMass.) had made Stanley M. Brand the House's General Counsel in 1979, with directions to begin representing the House's institutional interest in litigation. 7 In 1982, Brand's office's significance received general recognition when the Administration filed the celebrated case of United States v. House of Representatives 8 to resolve the Anne Gorsuch/Superfund executive privilege dispute. Brand won the case, and then left to found his own firm, 9 leaving Steven R. Ross as his successor for the challenging next decade.
Increasingly, both counsel offices defended civil suits, 10 and provided advice and litigation support for congressional investigations on matters such as privilege invocations 11 and demands on the investigators for records or testimony.
12
By the 1990s, the counsel offices faced the diverse additional legal fallout from the newly intense focus upon congressional ethics, on matters ranging from the 6. A helpful description of the office's functions written by Michael Davidson is, Senate Legal Counsel, in FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN M. FRUMIN, RIDDICK'S SENATE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 101-28, at 1236 NO. 101-28, at -46 (1992 . M. Elizabeth Culbreth, Majority Leader Baker's selection in 1981 to be Deputy Legal Counsel, established a pattern of nonpartisan trust and effectiveness in the office, successfully concluding the sensitive long-running case about congressional franking practices. See Common Cause v. Bolger, 512 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1980 Supp. 26 (D.D.C. ), aff'd, 461 U.S. 911 (1983 .
7. At the time, the title was formally Counsel to the Clerk of the House, but with Speaker O'Neill's backing, the position assumed its broader role, ultimately having its name changed to House General Counsel to match that role. The office at varying times has been administratively independent and a part of the Clerk's system of House support offices, but either way the office has been independent of supervision on legal decisions other than by general reporting to the Speaker and majority and minority leaderships (similar to other House professional offices such as the Parliamentarian). The rule defining the office's function is currently Rule I.11 11. See Harris v. Board of Governors, 938 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1991) ; In re Harrisburg Grand Jury, 638 F. Supp. 43 (M.D. Pa. 1986) . One Assistant Senate Legal Counsel went on to publish the treatise on the general subject. See JOHN C. GRABOW, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (1988 14. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. 15. His replacement was read by some observers to signal a majority party leadership removal of one of the buffers against partisanship in the office, though the signal lay only in that replacement, not in the actual functioning of the office thereafter, which has continued to win respect. See Harvey Berkman, Senate Hires an Outsider as Counsel, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 27, 1995, at A14; Mary Jacoby, Outgoing Senate Legal Counsel Asked to Stay as Deputy Counsel After 16 Years in Top Job, ROLL CALL, Mar. 16, 1995; Eamon Javers, Dole Picks New Senate Counsel to Replace Democrat, THE HILL, Mar. 15, 1995, at 8; Daniel Klaidman, Partisan Power Grab?; Senate Counsel Shakeup, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 13, 1995, at 1. An important element of continuity, notwithstanding the replacement of the Senate Legal Counsel, was the choice by the Democratic leadership of Morgan Frankel, who had rendered distinguished service since 1981 as Deputy Legal Counsel.
16. Two House General Counsels served between 1994, when I ceased being Acting General Counsel but continued as Solicitor, and 1996, when Geraldine R. Gennet started as Acting and then full General Counsel. See Daniel Klaidman, From Hill Outsider to House In-Houser, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 16, 1995 , at 1. The office's regular work of responding to private lawsuits and subpoenas continued during the transition, particularly in two cases that I argued: Albanese v. Molinari, 884 F. Supp. 685 (E.D.N.Y. 1995 ), and Maddox v. Williams, 855 F. Supp. 406 (D.D.C. 1994 ), aff'd sub nom., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1995 erned the deportation of aliens for lack of a legal right to remain in the United States. 19 The statute empowered the Attorney General to suspend such deportations but also provided that either the House or the Senate could veto the suspension of deportation by enacting a one-chamber "veto" resolution.
20
Such legislative vetos had a long history.
21
Particularly since the massive delegations of authority by Congress to the President beginning with the New Deal and World War II, Congress had sought to cabin the delegations through legislative veto provisions. Presidents had sought the delegations of power, sometimes accepting and sometimes protesting the accompanying legislative vetoes. Ultimately, in the cases of the 1980s regarding an array of statutory devices, the courts drew a formalist line invalidating some types of provisions, but allowing other types to stand.
The decisive round of litigation began when opponents of the legislative veto got one deportable alien, Jagdish Rai Chadha, to bring a test case. The Senate and House each had counsel present the case to the Supreme Court in briefing and argument. I drafted the Senate's main brief.
22
The case, and the other litigation over the legislative veto, support several conclusions regarding the role of congressional counsel in this category of litigation. First, the legislative veto litigation illustrates how, in such relatively less partisan matters, Members of Congress allow congressional counsel to represent the readily discernible institutional interest.
23
On the presidential side, Presidents from Franklin Roosevelt to Carter and Bush sought authority that came only with some type of legislative veto arrangement. The Presidents considered, but repeatedly overruled, the legally grounded protests against legislative veto arrangements expressed by their Attorneys General or, in Bush's case, White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray. While the presidents had their way in accepting legislative veto arrangements, DOJ had its own way in litigation, starting with the Chadha case in the (Democratic) Carter Administration and continuing in the (Republican) Reagan Administration. 24 In other words, the Executive Branch separated the process of making legislation and arrangements with Congress, where it did not have a particular consistent institutional position against legislative vetoes, from the process of litigation, where it did.
Similarly, in Congress, enacting or arranging legislative vetoes appealed to conservative Republicans and appalled progressive Democrats, or vice-versa, depending on the particular statutory context. 25 Members of Congress wished to make up their own minds, by whatever mix of policy, legal, and other factors, about whether to enact or to establish otherwise various legislative veto arrangements, and whether, after their establishment, to trigger them regarding particular Executive actions. 26 However, Members of Congress, as did Presidents, seemed willing, once litigation began, to let the matter be handled by their institutional litigation counsel. Members simply accepted that if the Executive Branch let its lawyers, on an institutional basis, seek judicial decisions invalidating a type of legislation, they should let their lawyers respond. It was appropriate for the issue to be left to institutional counsel to view in a longterm, institutional way, for two reasons. First, individual members recognized that their interests were too lightly engaged on the issue compared to the collective interest of the Senate and House. Second, party mechanisms that articulate collective interests in ways that divide the legislative institution also did not engage on the issue. DOJ's litigative stance did not involve any partisan component, as it first weighed-in during the Carter Administration, when the same party controlled both branches, and continued unchanged into the Reagan Administration, serenely ignoring the changes in party fortune in the 1980 election. DOJ's nonpartisanship induced legislative nonpartisanship. The issue consistently seemed institutional, not partisan. Thus, our challenge as congressional counsel was not in discerning or securing agreement about the overall institutional interest. The same vague notions by which the Executive Branch let DOJ "attack" the legislative veto, similarly caused the Legislative Branch to let congressional counsel "defend" it. 25. For example, conservative members approved legislative vetoes regarding regulatory rulemaking, while progressive members approved the legislative veto in the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § § 1541-1548 (1994) .
26. For expert nonpartisan advice on such matters during the legislating process, members' primary resource consists of the specialists in the Congressional Research Service's American Law Division, such as Mort Rosenberg, or in the Government Division, such as Louis Fisher, rather than the litigators in the congressional counsels' offices. Rather, our challenge was implementing a long-term view for the widely varying legislative vetoes facing challenges in successive constitutional cases. To be sure, for all the lawsuits, we had overall formalistic and functionalist themes: formalistically, that each statute containing a legislative veto had received bicameral approval and presentment (albeit that veto resolutions did not), and functionally, that the legislative veto device existed to confine delegations of authority. However, implementing a long-term view involved much more than merely repeating those overall arguments. In each of the widely varying statutory settings, from the immigration and regulatory laws to the appropriation and procurement laws, the long-term view was to differentiate the legislative veto statutes and to elucidate their origins and roles in checking delegated authority in different statutory settings. 27 Implicit in that strategy was our conclusion that Congress's institutional interest lay in achieving a judicial standard that dealt with each statute on a particularized basis. We knew the judicial hostility to some legislative vetoes. 28 We knew, from discussions and observations with members and staff, the great importance of the diverse web of congressional review arrangements from conditional nonstatutory "report-and-wait" arrangements to the War Powers Resolution's provision for bicameral resolutions ending U.S. military involvement in hostilities. Given that knowledge, and the freedom of action that Congress gave its institutional counsel on this issue for the previously described reasons, we defined the institutional interest as preserving as much of that web of congressional arrangements as could survive a succession of cases.
With this long-term approach to defining and defending the legislative interest, the Chadha decision, albeit a major defeat for us, by no means ended the whole subject. Following Chadha in 1983, Attorney General Edwin Meese's main Chadha-based thrust consisted of his assertive declaration that the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, 29 with its legislative provision that stayed procurements pending a form of legislative review, was unconstitutional and should not be obeyed by the Executive Branch. 30 Congress succeeded early in forcing the withdrawal of Meese's declaration of unconstitutionality, and succeeded ultimately in completely defending that provision, winning decisions 28. We had more information about judicial hostility to legislative vetoes than did almost anyone else in Congress, since we knew from oral arguments the thinking of many judges who did not write opinions on the merits in our cases. upholding the statute in both circuit courts that heard cases. 31 These victories for the legislative interest followed from defining the litigation approach as differentiating the diverse statutory contexts-specifically, for the 1984 Act cases, the particular setting of the Act's aim of curbing waste and abuse in defense procurement, and the particular mechanism of a limited stay (not "veto") of procurement decisions.
32 Thereafter, with Chadha's limits established, variants of the legislative veto device, particularly nonstatutory ones, flourished.
33
The challenge of defending the congressional interest on issues of statutory constitutionality went well beyond the core of head-on clashes like Chadha.
34
DOJ claimed other powers in this context, such as refusing to defend a statute when it deemed the arguments for the statute's constitutionality unreasonable. Other disputes concern constitutional issues regarding various other congressional processes from trial of judicial impeachments 42 to Senate confirmation authority infringed by presidential recess appointments.
43
Each of these controversies could have its own case study. 44 The bottom line would generally be that where the Executive Branch has an institutional opposition to Congress's powers without particular partisan overtones, the Congress therefore faces the question of defending without particular partisan overtones. With partisanship muted, the challenge in these cases for congressional counsel tends less to be discerning an institutional interest, than professionally defining that defense in a way that protects the institution's long-term as well as short-term interest. This matter reflects the type of work about which the majority and minority parties dispute what the congressional counsels should do. The dispute raises a question about whether there is an institutional interest at all. 51 The answer to that question is twofold. First, Congress's procedures allow many nuances in just how partisan a decision is. The Senate minority opposed the 1995 Whitewater notes enforcement vote, but it did not filibuster, and it gave no audible objection to the legitimacy of the outcome, both steps that would likely occur if the majority party sought Senate enforcement of an unfair subpoena to, say, the National Organization of Women. Second, as described in the previous discussion of Chadha, the Members' vote during enactment of a measure and the role of the Senate Legal Counsel after enactment can differ. Under some circumstances, even after a party-line vote adopts something, defending or, for subpoena enforcement resolutions, implementing that vote can occur in a way detached from the partisan decision to adopt.
For something like the Whitewater Subpoena matter, the Senate Legal Counsel would succeed in following-up a partisan vote and by carefully sorting out and discarding the partisan arguments made for enforcing the subpoena and by adopting and developing the institutional arguments in litigation. 52 The partisan arguments to be discarded are the accusations against the President and his staff about which partisan supporters and opponents sharply disagree; that they do not deserve attorney-client privilege because they assertedly discussed committing violations of law. The institutional arguments to be developed are, for example, why even guiltless Executive officials would not be able in this particular context to deny the notes of their discussions to an authorized congressional investigation. The Senate's institutional position would be the privilege's inapplicability in this context: The President had chosen not to in-50. 141 CONG. REC. S18993 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) . 51. That 1995 vote reflected a basic political judgment-the majority party demonstrating opposition to and the minority party demonstrating support of-the White House in that situation. Skeptics may well argue that, at such points, no "institutional" interest exists at all, only the interest of each party. The outcome consists of one party or the other obtaining the use of the institution's authority not some epiphany of a pre-existing institutional interest. Of course, there are parallels to whether, in other action contexts, there is a "public interest" or a "legislative intent," as opposed to clashing particular interests that win the government or legislative action they seek. I have recently discussed some of the applications of positive political theory and public choice theory to this context. See Charles Tiefer, Congressional Oversight of the Clinton Administration and Congressional Procedure, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 199 (1998) ; Charles Tiefer, "Budgetized" Health Entitlements and the Fiscal Constitution in Congress's 1995 Congress's -1996 Budget Battle, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 411, 420-25 (1996) .
52. In the majority and minority portions of the Whitewater notes committee report, the legally sophisticated treatment of the opposing arguments about privilege in the matter anticipates the issues in court. See THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE WHITEWATER DEVELOPMENT COR-PORATION AND RELATED MATTERS, REFUSAL OF WILLIAM H. KENNEDY, III, TO PRODUCE NOTES SUBPOENAED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE WHITEWATER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND RELATED MATTERS, S. REP. NO. 104-191 (1995) . As Assistant Senate Legal Counsel, I helped draft the committee reports for two such enforcement actions. The charter for the Senate Legal Counsel's office specifies the particular contents for such a report. See 2 U.S.C. § 288d(c) (1994).
voke executive privilege formally and the attorney-client privilege arguably could not be raised, at a sufficiently strong level to block a Senate subpoena, absent such a formal Presidential invocation. 53 Other examples of partisan disputes over the congressional counsels' assignments further illustrate what the 1995 Senate example suggests. From time to time in the House, minority members challenge the running of the chamber in the form either of lawsuits 54 or of raising questions about the House General Counsel's positions regarding outside lawsuits 55 or DOJ subpoenas. 56 Since the 1995 transition in party control, the General Counsel has been involved in representation in the course of various minority party challenges. The minority party challenged the new House rule requiring a three-fifths supermajority vote for tax increases. In response, the House General Counsel defended the rule, winning in court. In 1997, the minority party Member who had won a disputed House election found herself the target, during the ensuing election contest, of a subpoena statute wielded by the majority party. She challenged the statute, the House General Counsel defended it, and the court upheld the statute.
57
Besides these types of cases, another complex dilemma for congressional counsel arises in the context of strong individual interests, namely, the cases of individual members in trouble or who have evidence about others.
58 For example, the counsel offices may provide representation regarding the Speech or Debate Clause, 59 the bedrock constitutional protection of the Senate and House against outside legal interference in cases of members prosecuted, 60 civilly sued, 61 or subjected to evidentiary demands.
62
This dilemma elicits a variety of responses. For example, because the traditional Senate and House counsels' approaches to criminal matters diverge somewhat, the House General Counsel's office has more readily stepped forward to represent institutional interests in criminal investigations or cases in a way that buffered members and staff against prosecutors, 63 as in the lengthy proceedings for Representative McDade. 64 The Senate Legal Counsel has been less forward about providing members and staff with such buffering.
65 My sixteen-year service in the two offices and my countless discussions with other counsel in both offices have led me to develop only a theory, not a confident understanding, of the difference.
66 I think of it in terms of a difference between the cultures of the two chambers. The House culture defers less to prosecutors, seeing their power frequently and potently employed, knowing there is no necessary correlation between the House's own internal judgments upon members and the diverse calculations of the ninety-plus politically appointed U.S. Attorneys around the country, and hence sometimes distrusting prosecutors' motivations and judgments.
67 Therefore, the House culture has approved, at least at times, General Counsels who scrap with prosecutors on members' behalf. Senators have a reduced sense of vulnerability to, and distrust of, prosecutors.
68
Hence, the Senate culture approves a Senate Legal Counsel who remains aloof from the controversies surrounding the occasional prosecutorial activity. Both cultures, on the other hand, are equally sensitized to, and fed up with, the mas- REV. 377 (1995) . Similarly, without raising any partisan dispute, the House General Counsel's office represented Speaker Gingrich in the wrongful discharge and defamation case filed by former House Historian Christina Jeffrey. See Amy Keller & Juliet Eilperin, Fired House Historian Files $16 Million Lawsuit Against Speaker, His Aide, and Three Democrats, ROLL CALL, May 16, 1996. 65. This is a matter of proportion, not complete Senate avoidance of criminal cases. During the grand jury investigation of Senator David Durenberger (R-Minn.), questions arose as to whether DOJ had infringed the Senator's Speech or Debate protections. Upon indictment, the Senate Legal Counsel did appear and file an amicus brief in support of Senator Durenberger. See United States v. Durenberger, Crim. No. 3-93-65, 1993 WL 738477 (D. Minn. Dec. 3, 1993 . For the case following the subsequent reindictment, see United States v. Durenberger, 48 F.3d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1995 .
66. It traces back to basic philosophical contrasts between the first House Counsel, Stanley Brand, and the first Senate Counsel, Michael Davidson, and yet the contrast has outlasted them both.
67. To show the very diverse manifestations of House suspicions of federal prosecutors, during the Reagan (and successor) Administrations, there were observations that Attorneys General had approved disproportionate numbers of black Democratic representatives for criminal investigation and prosecution. During the Bush Administration, there were observations that the Attorney General set up a House Bank inquiry calculated maximally to injure Representatives in the 1992 election. During the Clinton Administration, Chairman Dan Burton (R-Ind.) expressed suspicions about the handling of his investigation for extortion, at a time when his committee was holding hearings about the Attorney General's handling of the 1996 campaign finance matter.
68. Senators are fewer in number, higher in status, having greater average age and experience, more likely to be of the same race as prosecutors, and somewhat more able to survive politically a prosecutorial inquiry due to their six-year terms and larger constituent bases. sive current tides of civil litigation and discovery, and so both cultures expect, and receive, counsel offices that aggressively respond to civil suits and subpoenas.
Whether the matter involves partisan interests, such as the 1995 Whitewater Subpoena, or individual interests, such as the cases of members in civil or criminal trouble, congressional counsel face the initial problem of finding an institutional interest to represent. Congressional counsel must find an interest that is distinct from some partisan or individual interest appropriation represented by majority and minority counsel on committees or in personal offices. They must serve the chamber's long-term, non partisan interest, not just seek to keep majority members in office or just promote the majority's political agenda. Even more, congressional counsel face the problem of perceptions and appearances, namely, that regardless of how well they do at finding and hewing to an institutional interest, critics will identify them with the partisan or individual interests also present in the case. 69 As the 1995 Whitewater Subpoena matter suggests, part of the answer in finding the institutional interests consists in recognizing that congressional counsel offices do not participate in planning or deciding the activities that are typically the basis of outside lawsuits, subpoenas, or investigations. As long as the member's activity occurs in her official capacity, she shares with all her colleagues the collective and, hence, institutional interest that official activities should receive the necessary support from official resources, including the resources for legal representation. Whatever the institution's reasons for allowing members to conduct their official and representational activities, from legislating and Washington casework to press releases and opening offices in the state or district, the institution has the same interest in providing legal representation that it has in providing office supplies, computer support, staff funding, and so forth. When the individual interest becomes very strong and the bounds of representation by government counsel loom near, as in criminal matters, then the primary representation function belongs to private counsel, with congressional counsel representing a separate institutional amicus.
As for the perception problem, the congressional counsel offices avoid many potential concerns by employing general policies about categories of cases in which they will and will not provide representation. As previously described, the offices represent members in the defense of civil suits and evidentiary demands arising out of their official position, without regard to the party of the member or the attractiveness of the particular representation. 70 On the other hand, congressional counsel take no part in individual members' quests for information 71 or in certain kinds of individual members' submissions as amicus curiae. 72 Such categorical rules depoliticize a large portion of the representational decisions, avoiding both the reality, and the perception, of conflict in many cases. Journalistic and member comment, and debate in the chamber, routinely follow whenever the counsel offices make a representational decision open to dispute.
V CONCLUSION
As each office approaches its twentieth anniversary next year, they seem to be a major success. There is no sign that either chamber thinks it could receive adequate representation from hired private counsel or from DOJ, as they did before 1979. 73 Moreover, the courts and DOJ accept congressional counsel as necessary presenters of a special federal government position. Today it is difficult to imagine how the Senate and House could determine their institutional interests, and present these to the legal world, without these legal offices.
Just as change in the legal environment of Congress produced the Senate and House Counsel offices, so, too, change in the Congress itself may intensify the dilemmas faced by those offices in finding the institutional interests they represent and avoiding the perception of identification with purely partisan or individual interests. Not only is the special climate of the formative period long past, 74 but the Congress of twenty years ago had several institutional-stability sources, now lacking, that mitigated internal conflicts and thereby made institutional interests more readily determinable. Political parties of that time had more overlap and more in common owing to "swing-vote" characteristics of conservative Southern Democrats and moderate Republicans. Member and staff turnover was lower. There was more institutional loyalty, comity, and civility to balance the centrifugal forces of hardened partisanship, electronic media coverage, and massive independent campaign financing. Rapid flips in party control for the presidency and both Houses make it harder for those at the political level in either branch of government to place credence in their branch's having a transcendant, stable, institutional interest.
The changed environment means more intense problems for institutional congressional counsel identifying, and gaining general agreement on, a transcendant institutional interest, but, at the same time, creates a certain urgency for them to do so. The sheer burden of legal defense costs in Washington's current legal climate of massive investigation, scrutiny, and civil suit discovery proceedings creates a common interest in Congress for counsel offices that lift that burden off of everyone, so long as the line drawn regarding when representation will be provided, and when not, is perceived as following consistent standards. In an era of member and staff turnover, and of flips in party control, Senate and House offices that can succeed in providing both the image, and the reality, of nonpartisanship and institutional memory become even more necessary. Therefore, the Senate and House will likely continue to impose upon their counsel offices the dilemma of choosing, in the midst of contention and disputation, something that approximates an institutional interest to represent.
